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Abstract
Product quality certifiers may not reveal the identity of unsuccessful ap-
plicants/sellers for three reasons. First, they respond to the desire of indi-
vidual sellers to avoid the stigma from rejection. Second, non-transparency
helps a certifier to increase his market power by raising the stigma from
lower-tier certification. Third, transparency does not help screen among het-
erogeneous sellers. Strategic complementarities arise as sellers move down
the certification pecking order and lead to the stigmatization of the lower
tiers. Mandating transparency benefits the sellers, but has an ambiguous
impact on buyers, who actually become less informed about product quality.
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1 Introduction
As most markets are characterized by imperfect knowledge, informational interme-
diaries have become central to their working. From underwriters to rating agencies,
from scientific journals to entry-level examinations, from standard-setting organ-
izations to system integrators, intermediaries serve sellers and buyers by providing
product-quality information to the latter.
The literature on intermediaries has carefully analyzed their incentives to col-
lect product-quality information and disclose it truthfully. By contrast, we know
little about three related aspects of the certification market: the publicity given to
applications (i.e., the transparency or opacity regarding rejections), the coarseness
of rating patterns, and the sellers’ sequential certification strategies. Policies in
these matters exhibit substantial heterogeneity.
Regarding the transparency of the application process, scientific journals, cer-
tified bond rating agencies, lenders, underwriters, employers, universities, and
organic food certifiers usually do not reveal rejected applications. By contrast,
some entry-level examinations (SAT, GMAT,...) have historically disclosed pre-
vious, and presumably unsuccessful, attempts by the student. In 2009, though,
the College Board began allowing students to only report certain SAT test scores
to colleges, rather than all results as previously. Critics questioned whether this
program was a competitive response to the competing ACT test, which has long
had a similar policy of non-transparency. For instance, Stanford’s admissions head
asked “Was this a student-centered decision? Or was this business-centered be-
cause they’re worried about losing market share?”1
Regarding the coarseness of grading, many institutions, such as most scientific
journals, adopt a “minimum standard” or “pass-fail” strategy, while others, such
1See Rimer (2008).
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as entry-level examination firms, report an exact grade. While a fine partition in
the grading space presumably requires more resources than a pass-fail approach,
what drives the choice of coarseness is unclear.
While we will consider a variety of examples, the illustration that we will return
to repeatedly is the certification of papers by academic journals. We here focus
on the role of journals as certifiers (informational intermediaries) more than as
distributors. While the two functions have historically been bundled, they need
not be. The relative importance of certification has increased with easy access
to alternative distribution modes, particularly in fields such as economics which
allow free circulation of unpublished working papers.2 The publication process
is opaque as almost all journals refrain from publishing the list of submitted or
rejected papers; they also by and large follow a minimum standard approach, even
though a lead article carries some added prestige.
But our analysis applies to a number of other industries. Table 1 reports the
strategies of some certifiers regarding publicity and grading. “Application opacity”
refers to the certifier’s policy of not disclosing rejected applications, not necessarily
to the outcome.3 Consider, for example, the recent efforts in the United States
to ensure transparency of the securities rating process, particularly in the area
of structured finance. Issuers have in a number of ways been able to get rating
2Our key insights hold whether the certifier charges buyers or sellers, and whether they
maximize profit or pursue a non-profit goal such as market share.
3For example, one may fortuitously learn that a paper was submitted to and rejected by a
journal; furthermore, a delayed publication may create some stigma as the profession is unsure
as to whether the delay is due to the author, slow editing or a rejection. This is likely to be less
of an issue in many journals in the hard sciences, where working papers are often embargoed
prior to publication. Similarly, while academic departments, corporations and partnerships warn
in advance assistant professors and junior members that they are unlikely to receive tenure or
keep their job, thereby allowing them to attempt to disguise a layoff as a resignation, information
leakages and the inference drawn from the very act of quitting limit this strategy. Relatedly,
faculty members who want to quit but expect to be successful at a particular promotion or
reappointment will often delay their resignation until after their review process is completed, as
they want to avoid the negative inference associated with an early resignation.
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agencies to not disclose adverse ratings. First, even if a firm appeals a rating
that displeases it and the appeal is rejected, the proposed rating still may not be
published. Instead, a “break-up fee” is paid by the issuer to the rating agency to
compensate it for its efforts (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008). Al-
ternatively, consulting services offered in recent years by rating agencies to issuers
may have made an apparently transparent process opaque.4
TABLE
As for sequential certification strategies, sellers often adopt an ambitious or
top-down submission strategy, in which they apply first to demanding and non-
transparent certifiers and then, in case of rejection, move down the pecking order.5
Why do we observe this pattern, and what determines the rejection rate, or equi-
valently whether submissions tend to be ambitious or realistic?
This paper develops a framework in which the descriptive and public policy
aspects of transparency and grading strategies can be initially analyzed. Needless
to say, our model does not capture all elements of each of the many relevant
situations, but only some key trade-offs that they share. It builds on the idea that
certifiers’ policies must reflect the demands of the two sides of the market, as well
as who has “gatekeeping power” over the certification process. In the majority of
applications in Table 1, the seller chooses the certifier.6 While they need to be
4“The inherent conflict facing the credit rating agency has been aggravated by their recent
marketing of advisory and consulting services to their clients. Today, the rating agencies receives
one fee to consult with a client, explain its model, and indicate the likely outcome of the rating
process; then, it receives a second fee to actually deliver the rating (if the client wishes to go
forward once it has learned the likely outcome). The result is that the client can decide not to
seek the rating if it learns that it would be less favorable than it desires; the result is a loss of
transparency to the market.” (Coffee 2008). See also Partnoy (2006).
5An exception to this widespread pattern is provided by publications in law journals, where
authors build on acceptance to move up the quality ladder.
6Interestingly in view of the pattern exhibited in Table 1, the seller does not choose the
certifier in the case of state licensing and professional exams.
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credible vis-à-vis the buyers, the certifiers must first cater to the sellers’ desires.
At an abstract level, a certifier’s policy maps the information it acquires about
the quality of the product into a public signal; if specified in the contract with
the seller, the certifier can refrain from providing a signal, thereby concealing the
existence of an application in order not to convey bad news about quality. We also
allow for fortuitous disclosure, as buyers may hear about the application “through
the grapevine” even though the certifier does not disclose it.
We find conditions under which sellers opt for an ambitious strategy. We derive
the comparative statics with respect to the sellers’ initial reputation, the probab-
ility of fortuitous disclosure, the sellers’ self-knowledge and impatience, and the
concentration of the certification industry. Finally, we investigate the implications
of regulating transparency.
The paper’s key insights are summarized in the conclusion, where we also re-
visit the patterns in Table 1. A key theme of the paper is that sellers have a
clear individual preference for non-transparency, as they do not want buyers to
know about their rejections. Tier-1 certifiers with market power have, as we will
show, two other motives for preferring non-transparency. A second broad theme is
that certification strategies exhibit strategic complementarities through the stigma
associated with second-tier certification: When certification by second-tier institu-
tions carries a big stigma, sellers are tempted to first aim high, thereby confirming
the buyers’ concern that second-tier certifiers attract previously rejected applica-
tions. A third theme relates to public policy. Non-transparency collectively always
hurts sellers (while its impact on buyers is ambiguous).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model, in which
only minimum-standard certification is offered. Section 3 solves for the equilibrium
in a competitive or concentrated certification industry and conducts the welfare
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analysis of transparency regulation. Section 4 develops a number of extensions: It
analyzes the impact of seller heterogeneity and allows for multi-tier grading. Sec-
tion 5 summarizes the insights and discusses a number of open questions. Finally,
the Appendix considers three additional extensions: It generalizes the basic model
by endogenizing the sellers’ quality choice; it allows certifiers to charge buyers;
and finally it examines the effect of entry by certifiers who trade off accuracy and
turn-around time.
Relationship to the literature
There is a large literature on certification in corporate finance, industrial or-
ganization and labor markets. Much of this literature focuses on the trade-off for
parties seeking certification between the cost of certification and its benefits in
terms of signaling, reduced agency costs or assortative matching. Much less has
been written on the industrial organization of the certifying industry.
A series of papers have studied the coarseness issue, without linking to opaque-
ness. Lizzeri’s (1999) classic paper analyzes the choice of coarseness in an environ-
ment in which the seller perfectly knows the quality of her product and applications
to a certifier are (endogenously) public. Lizzeri shows that a monopoly certifier
may either disclose nothing at all or go for a minimal standard, while a competit-
ive certifying industry can lead to full disclosure of quality. Faure-Grimaud et al.
(2009), in a model in which sellers are imperfectly informed about the quality of
their product, allow sellers to “own ratings,” in the sense that they can hide the
rating from the buyers if they choose to. They show that the imprecision of the
rating technology per se does not lead to certifiers offering the concealment op-
tion to sellers. Rating ownership arises only if sellers are very unsure about their
product’s quality. In Lerner—Tirole (2006), certifiers differentiate through their
composition and decision-making processes, making them more or less friendly to
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sponsors’ interests. The current paper investigates certifiers’ positioning with re-
spect to transparency; it further analyzes sequential rejections, an issue that does
not arise when the technology sponsor’s objective is simply to have the technology
adopted, as in Lerner-Tirole.
In environments such as those considered in Lizzeri and Lerner-Tirole, in which
either the seller has a single chance to be certified or the seller’s application is pub-
lic, the certifier cannot or does not want to conceal applications. Faure-Grimaud
et al. do allow for the possibility of hiding the rating, but do not consider the
possibility of a second chance, perhaps by going to a less demanding certifier.
Morrison andWhite (2005) and Gill and Sgroi (2004) allow for a second chance,
but do not focus on the opacity issue. Banks in Morrison-White apply to regulat-
ors with different perceived abilities. A successful application to a tough regulator
allows banks to raise more deposits. As regulators make mistakes, banks may get
a second chance. On the other hand, the Morrison-White paper focuses on rather
different issues than our paper; for instance, it assumes that applications are trans-
parent. By contrast, applications are non-transparent in Skreta-Veldkamp’s (2009)
work on rating ownership; in that paper, sellers shop for ratings and disclose them
selectively. Each rating agency issues an unbiased forecast of the product qual-
ity (there is no coarseness choice). Buyers are naïve. The selective disclosure of
ratings by sellers matters more, the more mistakes certifiers make; Skreta and
Veldkamp thereby provide a narrative on the recent treatment of complex assets
by financial rating agencies. In a related vein, Sangiorgi et al. (2009) analyze the
winner’s curse problem associated with more sophisticated buyers and the select-
ive disclosure of ratings. Bolton-Santos-Scheinkman (2011) analyzes interactions
between an opaque OTC market and a transparent exchange, in which the OTC
market may siphon out good assets and lower the perceived quality of assets in
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the exchange, leading to a multiplicity of equilibria similar to that unveiled in
Proposition 1 below. Bolton et al. study themes, such as dealer rents and the
talent allocation to finance, that we do not pursue.
Like these papers, we assume that certifiers have sufficient governance or repu-
tation to abide by the reporting rule that they announce.7 Certifiers’ reputation
building is analyzed in Biglaiser (1993), Bolton-Freixas-Shapiro (2011), Bouvard-
Levy (2009) and Mathis et al (2009). Relatedly, our focus on coarseness relates to
the very extensive literature on cheap talk. But unlike in the cheap talk literature,
there is here no issue of credibility of the reporting strategy, as certifiers are as
truthful as their reporting rule allows them to be. Coarseness thus stems from




Time is discrete and runs from −∞ to +∞. There is a mass 1 and a steady
inflow of sellers, each with one product of unknown single-dimensional quality.
For simplicity, the representative seller’s quality i, which is initially unknown to
both sides of the market, can take one of three values: high (H), low (L) or
“abysmal” (−∞), with respective benefits for the buyers bi ∈ {bH, bL,−∞} with
7Of course, this assumption does not always hold in the real world. For instance, some critics
have accused rating agencies of initially being excessively generous when rating new offerings,
then revising the rating months later. They suggest that the natural organizations to question
this behavior, the investment banks, had little incentive to do so, because they had typically
“laid off” any exposure to the securities through refinancings (U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2003).
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bH > bL > −∞.8 Conditional on not being abysmal, quality is high with prior
probability ρ and low with prior probability 1 − ρ. Buyers prefer quality H to
quality L, and do not consider the product unless its quality has been certified to
be at least L. A seller whose quality has not been certified to be at least L does
not bring the product to the market and obtains zero profit.
Assuming that this certification has taken place, let ρ denote the buyers’ pos-
terior belief at the time at which the product is brought to the market (more on
this shortly). Let Si(ρ) denote the seller’s expected gain from putting a product
of quality i on the market when beliefs are ρ. We will assume that Si is always
positive and is weakly increasing in ρ^.
Certifiers. Profit-maximizing certifiers audit quality. Throughout the paper, we
will assume that, whether through reputation or a credible internal-audit mech-
anism, certifiers are able to commit to a disclosure policy, that is to a mapping
from what they learn to what they disclose to buyers. This ability to commit to
a disclosure policy makes the question of the structure of their incentive scheme
moot,9 and so we can assume without loss of generality that they demand a fixed
fee for the certification service. To sum up, a certifier’s strategy is the combination
of a fixed fee and a disclosure policy. (Our results are qualitatively the same if we
alternatively assume that certifiers do not charge fixed fees and that their object-
ive is to maximize market share. When certifiers are atomistic and competition is
perfect, the outcome is exactly the same. Differences potentially materialize when
we consider monopolistic competition.)
Because certifiers are useless unless they rule out the abysmal quality, we can
consider three types of certifiers, two “minimum standard” certifiers and one “full
8The role of the assumption that quality can be −∞ is to ensure that goods must be certified.
We could alternatively have directly made the assumption that goods must be certified.
9An arbitrary incentive scheme can be duplicated through a fixed payment (equal to the
expected payment under the incentive scheme) and the same commitment to a disclosure policy.
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grade” or "multi-tier" certifier:
A tier-1 certifier ascertains that b = bH or b ∈ {bL ,−∞}. Tier-1 certifiers
furthermore do not disclose applications for which they find that b ∈ {bL ,−∞}, as
such disclosure of bad news (a “rejection”) is unappealing to sellers and reduces
the demand for such certifiers’ services.
A tier-2 certifier certifies that b ∈ {bH ,bL} or b = −∞.10
A multi-tier certifier discloses the true quality: b = bH ,bL or −∞.
We will normalize the audit cost incurred by a minimum standard certifier
to be 0. By contrast, the cost of a finer grading may be positive (see Section
4.3). Certifiers compete for the sellers’ business. The certification market, unless
otherwise stated, is perfectly competitive. Equilibrium fees are then equal to 0.
Timing. Consider a seller who arrives at date t and chooses a certifier. She can
contract with a single certifier in each period. Contingent on the outcome of cer-
tification(s), the seller chooses the date, t + τ (τ ≥ 0), at which she brings the
product to the market. If the buyers’ beliefs at that date are ρ = ρt+τ, then the
seller’s utility is
δτSi(ρt+τ)
where δ < 1 is the discount factor. Thus the seller maximizes
E[δτSi(ρt+τ)].
In our model, there are only two (relevant) levels of quality and audits of a given
10Obviously, the certifier’s reporting strategy for b = −∞ is irrelevant, as the seller then always
makes no profit. If, by contrast, we assumed that sellers have other products, the production of
an "abysmal quality" could be a bad signal for other offerings. One would then expect that the
information that b = −∞ would not be disclosed either.
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kind always deliver the same outcome.11 And so a date-t product will actually be
brought to the market either at t or at t+ 1.
There can be fortuitous disclosure: When a seller arrives at date t and does not
bring her product to the market until date t + 1, with probability d ≥ 0, buyers
exogenously discover that the date-(t + 1) introduction corresponds to a date-t
arrival. With probability 1− d, buyers receive no such information.12
Equilibrium: We will analyze perfect Bayesian equilibria. If multiple equilibria co-
exist, which can be Pareto ranked for the sellers, we will select the Pareto dominant
one.
Sellers’ attitude toward information revelation. In general, sellers may, ceteris
paribus, welcome or dread the revelation of information about quality. Our key
insights do not depend on which obtains, but some comparative statics results
can be obtained with regard to seller attitudes in this respect. We will say that
the seller is information loving (respectively, averse) if in a situation in which
she could not get a second chance, she would prefer full revelation (respectively, a
coarse disclosure specifying that quality is at least L). Thus, sellers are information
loving if ρSH(1) + (1 − ρ)SL(0) > ρSH(ρ) + (1 − ρ)SL(ρ); information averse if
ρSH(1)+(1−ρ)SL(0) < ρSH(ρ)+(1−ρ)SL(ρ); information neutral if ρSH(1)+(1−
ρ)SL(0) = ρSH(ρ)+ (1− ρ)SL(ρ). Note that when Si (ρ) = S (ρ) is independent of
i, sellers are information loving if and only if S (ρ) is strictly convex, information
averse if and only if S (ρ) is strictly concave, and information neutral if and only if
11There is no certifier-idiosyncratic noise, unlike in Morrison-White (2005) or Skreta-Veldkamp
(2009).
12Fortuitous disclosures will in equilibrium decrease the seller’s utility when being rejected.
Note that learning that the seller arrived at date t is here equivalent to learning that her ap-
plication was rejected at date t. We could easily enrich the model by adding “slow sellers,” who
arrive at date t, but apply only at date t+ 1. Such sellers would suffer an unfair stigma if the
date of their arrival is made public, as do papers in academia that authors are slow at submitting
to a journal.
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S (ρ) is affine. Section 2.2 provides some illustrations of preferences with respect
to information. For example, a demand for assortative matching between buyers
and sellers tends to make sellers information-loving. Belief risk aversion or the
presence of complementary sales push in the direction of information aversion.
2.2 Examples
Example 1 (sale). Suppose that production is costless and that the seller sells the
product to homogenous, price-taking consumers. Then, under such first-degree
price discrimination
Si(ρ) = max {Eρ[b], 0}
is independent of i, where Eρ[b] ≡ ρbH+(1−ρ)bL denotes the consumers’ posterior
assessment of quality.
Example 2 (sale with imperfect price discrimination). Following up on Example 1,
assume now that there are two types of consumers, indexed by a = aH (proportion
µ) or aL (proportion 1−µ) with aH > aL. If b = Eρ[b], the gross surplus of a user
of type j ∈ {H, L} is aj+b. “Belief-sensitive pricing” (which would be the “generic
case” with a continuum of types) arises when user surplus depends on posterior
beliefs ρ,13 i.e., when
aL + bH > µ(aH + bH) and aL + bL < µ(aH + bL).
13The other two cases are isomorphic to Example 1, as the volume of sales is not affected by
beliefs.
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aL + b for ρ ≥ ρ0
µ(aH + b) for ρ < ρ0
where
aL + [ρ0bH + (1− ρ0)bL] = µ[aH + ρ0bH + (1− ρ0)bL].




µ(aH − aL) for ρ ≥ ρ0
0 for ρ < ρ0
.
Example 3 (clientele effects / assortative matching). Some buyers may have a
strong preference for high-quality offerings due to prudential regulation. For ex-
ample, many public pension funds are allowed to hold only investment-grade se-
curities. Full grading allows the seller to better segment the market. Suppose that
a fraction of buyers buy only high-quality products, at price KbH where K > 1.
Other buyers are less discriminating and are as depicted in Example 1. Then
Si(ρ) = KbH1I{ρ=1} +max{Eρ[b], 0}1I{ρ<1},
is again independent of i.
Example 4 (spillovers from adoption). A researcher whose paper is read and used
by the profession, or a technology sponsor whose intellectual property becomes
part of a royalty-free standard benefit only indirectly from adoption (prestige,
referencing, diffusion of ideas for a researcher, network effects or spillovers to com-
plementary products for a technology sponsor). Letting si denote the seller’s gross
13
benefit from adoption. The seller’s surplus is then:14
Si(ρ) = si1I{Eρ [b]≥0}.
Note that in this case the seller’s surplus in general depends directly on quality i.
If bL ≥ 0, the seller is information neutral in Examples 1 and 4, and inform-
ation loving in Example 3. If bL < 0, she is information loving when she fully
appropriates the consumer surplus through a price (Examples 1 and 3). Similarly,
the seller is information-loving or neutral in Example 2.
By contrast, the seller is information averse if Eρ[b] > 0 and if she is unable
to charge the buyer and therefore has buyer adoption as her primary objective.
The seller then always benefits from a no grading, simple-acceptance policy (see
Lerner-Tirole 2006), weakly so in the two-type case when bL ≥ 0 (as in Example
4) and strictly so with two types and bL < 0 or with a continuum of types, some
of them negative. That way, she is able to “pool” negative-buyer-surplus states
with positive-buyer-surplus ones.
3 Minimum standard certifiers
3.1 Equilibrium behavior with competitive certifiers
There is no point for a seller to apply to a tier-2 certifier unless she goes to
the market following an endorsement. Similarly, after an application to a tier-1
certifier, the seller brings the product to the market if the latter is a high-quality
one and applies to a tier-2 certifier in case of rejection. The equilibrium thus
exhibits the familiar pattern of moving down the pecking order, with diminishing
14Where 1I{·} is the indicator function.
14
expectations.
Let x denote the fraction of sellers who choose an ambitious strategy (start
with a tier-1 certifier, and apply to a tier-2 certifier in case of rejection). Fraction
1− x select the safe strategy (go directly to a tier-2 certifier).
When faced with a product certified by a tier-2 certifier, buyers form beliefs:


ρ = 0 if they know the product introduction is delayed (as they then infer
a rejection in the previous period), and
ρ = ρ(x) ≡ (1− x)ρ/ [1− x+ x(1− ρ)(1− d)] otherwise.
Note that ρ(x) decreases from ρ to 0 as x increases from 0 to 1.
Let
W1(ρ) ≡ ρSH(1) + (1− ρ)δ[dSL(0) + (1− d)SL(ρ)]
and
W2(ρ) ≡ ρSH(ρ) + (1− ρ)SL(ρ)
denote the expected payoffs15 when applying to a tier-1 or tier-2 certifier, when
certification by a tier-2 certifier delivers reputation ρ. A crucial property is that,
due to (a) discounting, (b) fortuitous disclosure, and (c) the fact that high types
pass tier-1 certification, the payoff from tier-2 certification is more sensitive to






• Safe-strategy equilibrium. It is an equilibrium for sellers to all adopt a safe
15Conditional on b ∈ {bL , bH }.
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strategy (x = 0)16 if W2(ρ) ≥W1(ρ):
ρSH(ρ) + (1− ρ)SL(ρ) ≥ ρSH(1) + δ(1− ρ)[(1− d)SL(ρ) + dSL(0)],
or
(1− ρ)[(1− δ)SL(ρ) + δd[SL(ρ) − SL(0)]] ≥ ρ[SH(1) − SH(ρ)]. (1)
Condition (1) captures the costs and benefits of a safe strategy. A safe strategy
avoids delaying introduction when quality is low, thereby economizing (1−δ)SL(ρ).
It also prevents the stigma associated with fortuitous disclosure, and thereby
provides gain δd[SL(ρ) − SL(0)]. The cost of a safe strategy is of course the lack
of recognition of a high quality and the concomitant loss SH(1) − SH(ρ).
Unsurprisingly, a safe-strategy equilibrium is more likely to emerge, the lower
the discount factor (e.g., the longer the certification length), and the higher the
rate of fortuitous disclosure. Indeed, when δ = 1, the safe-strategy equilibrium
never exists (i.e., even for d = 1) if the seller is information loving.
• Ambitious-strategy equilibrium. Next, consider an equilibrium in which all
sellers adopt an ambitious strategy. Certification by a second-tier certifier is then
very bad news. Thus x = 1 is an equilibrium if and only if W1(0) ≥W2(0):
ρSH(1) + δ(1− ρ)SL(0) ≥ ρSH(0) + (1− ρ)SL(0) (2)
• Mixed-strategy equilibrium. Finally, consider a mixed equilibrium in which
16Observed certifier rankings always start with “tier-1”, almost by definition. One interpret-
ation of our model is that this particular class of sellers (products) is an identifiable subgroup
of sellers (products), who in equilibrium apply to tier-2 certifiers (on this, see also Section 4.2
below). Another interpretation speaks to the very definition of “tier-1”, “tier-2”, etc. What we
here call “tier-2” could in practice be called “tier-1” if no seller applied to what we define as
“tier-1” certifiers. For example, no “super tier-1” journal has been created that would be more
demanding than the top-5 economics journals and only take, say, the ten best papers of the year.
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x > 0 (some sellers adopt an ambitious strategy), that is W1(ρ(x)) = W2(ρ(x)):
ρSH(1)+ δ(1− ρ)[(1−d)]SL(ρ(x))+dSL(0)] = ρSH(ρ(x)) + (1− ρ)SL(ρ(x)). (3)
Condition (3) has at most one solution x. Note also that whenever a mixed
equilibrium exists, the safe-strategy equilibrium also exists, and it dominates the
mixed equilibrium from the point of view of the sellers. In both a mixed equilibrium
and a safe-strategy one, the safe strategy is an optimal strategy; but the stigma is
weaker in a safe-strategy one and so sellers are better-off under the safe-strategy
equilibrium. The seller-centric Pareto-dominance criterion implies that we can
ignore mixed equilibria from now on.
Note that an individual seller does not want to apply to a tier-1 certifier who
discloses rejections, i.e., a transparent tier-1 certifier. If the equilibrium features
ambitious strategies, then sellers are indifferent between applying to a transparent
or a non-transparent certifier, since every application to a tier-2 certifier was first
rejected by a tier-1 certifier. If the equilibrium features any positive fraction of
sellers who go for the safe strategy, then no seller applies to a transparent tier-1
certifier.
Interestingly, there may exist multiple pure equilibria. For example for d = 0,
the conditions for the safe-strategy and the ambitious-strategy equilibria can be
written:
ρSH(1) ≤ ρSH(ρ) + (1− ρ)(1− δ)SL(ρ) (4)
and
ρSH(1) ≥ ρSH(0) + (1− ρ)(1− δ)SL(0). (5)
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Indeed, the sellers’ certification strategies are strategic complements: Ambitious
certification strategies depreciate tier-2 certification. A low payoff from being cer-
tified by a tier-2 certifier in turn encourages ambitious applications. Focusing on
seller welfareW1 andW2, Figure 1 depicts the possible equilibrium configurations
(the dotted line refers to the outcome under mandated transparency, to be ana-
lyzed shortly, and should be ignored for the moment). Eligible beliefs following
tier-2 certification range from ρ = 0 (all sellers first try a tier-1 certifier, and go
to a tier-2 certifier only when rejected) to ρ = ρ (no stigma from tier-2 certifica-
tion). Under configurations (i) and (ii), one of the strategies (safe and ambitious
strategy, respectively) dominates the other, regardless of the stigma attached to
tier-2 certification. The equilibrium is then unique. In the third configuration,
strategic complementarities lead to three equilibria, two of them stable: all sellers
adopt an ambitious strategy (ρ = 0 and W1(0) ≥ W2(0)) or all go for the safe
strategy (ρ = ρ and W2(ρ) ≥ W1(ρ)). The seller-centric Pareto-dominant equi-
librium (yielding the highest welfare among equilibrium outcomes) corresponds to
ρ = ρ.
FIGURE 1
Proposition 1 With minimum standard certifiers, certification choices are stra-
tegic complements: a seller’s choice of an ambitious strategy encourages other
sellers to turn to a tier-1 certifier. Furthermore,
(i) the (Pareto-dominant for the sellers) equilibrium exhibits
• the ambitious strategy of applying to a non-transparent tier-1 certifier, and then,
in case of rejection, to a tier-2 certifier (tiered certification) iff
W1(ρ) > W2(ρ), (6)
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• the safe strategy of applying directly to a tier-2 certifier otherwise.
(ii) ambitious strategies are more likely, the lower the probability of fortuitous
disclosure (the lower d is), and the more patient the seller (the higher δ is); when
δ = 1 and d = 1 ambitious strategies are adopted if and only if the seller is
information loving.
An example of impatient sellers in many American universities is junior faculty
members, who are about to come up for tenure.17 For instance, an assistant pro-
fessor in the strategy group at a business school may submit a promising empirical
analysis to Management Science, rather than submitting it to the American Eco-
nomic Review. In part, this choice is driven by the different time frames that the
two journals typically have for reviewing papers (on this, see Appendix 3 and the
online Appendix). But the junior faculty member may sense that a rejection by a
tier-1 certifier would make the track record at the tenure review too thin.18
3.2 Regulation of transparency
In reaction to the subprime crisis, the US Treasury chose to require structured
investment vehicles to disclose ratings (even unfavorable ones). This section studies
whether regulation of disclosure increases welfare in industries in which sellers shop
around for certification.19
17The junior faculty’s impatience can reasonably be assumed to be common knowledge, and so
we can perform comparative statics with respect to the discount factor (part (ii) of Proposition
1).
18If the existing track record makes the tenure decision marginal. Risk-taking by contrast is
optimal if the track record is weak.
19We focus on governmental regulations. An interesting and related subject of inquiry could be
concerned with social regulation (social norms). For example, a social group “regulates” against
transparency when ostracizing one of its members who reveals a rejection incurred by another
member (in professional or personal matters).
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Suppose that a regulator can enforce transparency of applications (this amounts
to setting d = 1). For given beliefs ρ attached to tier-2 certification, a certification
by a tier-2 certifier still yields (“T” refers to “transparency”) W2T (ρ) = W2(ρ).
By contrast, application to a tier-1 certifier yields a lower payoff than in the
absence of transparency:
W1T = W1 (0) < W1(ρ) whenever ρ > 0,
The analyis of Section 3.1 applies, with W1(ρ) replaced by W1(0). Application
to a transparent tier-1 certifier (with payoffs as depicted by the dashed horizontal
line in Figure 1) is an equilibrium behavior if and only if
W1 (0) ≥W2(ρ).
And so if W1 (0) < W2(ρ) < W1(ρ), or
ρSH(1)+δ(1−ρ)SL(0) < ρSH(ρ)+(1−ρ)SL(ρ) < ρSH(1)+δ(1−ρ)[(1−d)SL(ρ)+dSL(0)],
the transparency requirement increases the sellers’ welfare: see case (ii) in Figure
1, where ρ = ρ was not an equilibrium under opaque applications and becomes (a
Pareto dominant) one under transparency. In the other parameter configurations
(cases (i) and (iii) in Figure 1), transparency has no impact on equilibrium outcome
and welfare.
Proposition 2 Transparency weakly improves sellers’ welfare.
Intuitively, transparency makes ambitious strategies less appealing to indi-
vidual sellers. It thereby eliminates the basic externality associated with ambi-
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tious strategies, which depreciate tier-2 certification. Proposition 2 therefore has
a natural feel.
Self-Regulation. Relatedly, would tier-1 certifiers agree among each other not to
compete on the transparency dimension and to disclose applications? The answer
is no, as they would thereby diminish their collective attractiveness.20
Buyer welfare. How does transparency impact buyers’ welfare? As we have seen,
transparency regulation makes a difference only in case (ii) of Figure 1, by killing
the ambitious-strategy equilibrium. The issue is thus whether buyers benefit from
more or less information. The answer to this question is case-specific. In the
first-degree price discrimination illustrations of Examples 1 and 3, buyers have no
surplus and so we can confine welfare analysis to that of sellers. In Example 4,
either ρbH +(1− ρ)bL ≥ 0 and then the equilibrium is always a safe-strategy one,
or ρbH + (1− ρ)bL < 0 and the equilibrium is always the ambitious-strategy one:
In either case transparency is irrelevant.
The analysis is more interesting for Example 2 (imperfect price discrimina-
tion). In the belief-sensitive-pricing case in Example 2,21 buyer net surplus in the
20To obtain a strict preference for non-transparency, one must assume that certifiers are slightly
differentiated (and thus can demand a positive fixed fee).
21I.e., when aL +bH > µ(aH +bH ) and aL +bL < µ(aH +bH). The sellers’ payoffs in the two
potential equilibrium configurations are:
W1 = ρ(aL + bH) + δ(1− ρ)µ(aH + bL)
W2 =

aL + [ρbH + (1− ρ)bL ] for ρ ≥ ρ0
µ[aH + [ρbH + (1− ρ)bL ]] for ρ < ρ0 .
21
ambitious-strategy and safe-strategy equilibria are:




µ(aH − aL) for ρ ≥ ρ0
0 for ρ < ρ0
respectively. Thus a transparency regulation that moves the equilibrium from am-
bitious to safe strategies increases (decreases) buyer welfare if ρ ≥ ρ0 (if ρ < ρ0).
We thus see that while mandated transparency always benefits sellers, it need not
benefit buyers. This is a noteworthy observation, in view of the fact that transpar-
ency regulation is often heralded as protecting buyers; needless to say, with naive
buyers, the case for transparency regulation would be stronger.
4 Extensions
4.1 Transparency and market power in the certification
industry
Assume now that the market for tier-i certification is monopolized, while tier-j
certifiers are still competitive (i, j ∈ {1, 2}).
Market power in tier-1 certification
Suppose first, that the tier-1 monopolist opts for non-transparency. For any
fixed fee F charged by the monopoly tier-1 certifier, we can apply the analysis
leading to Proposition 1: we only need to replace the function W1(ρ) by the
function W1(ρ) − F. We keep assuming that sellers coordinate on the equilibrium
that is best for them if there are multiple equilibria, and so from Proposition 1,
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the monopoly tier-1 certifier attracts the sellers if and only if
W1(ρ) − F > W2(ρ).
Because the monopolist does not want to charge negative fees and thereby lose
money, we assume that (6) is satisfied. In equilibrium, sellers opt for the ambitious
strategy and apply first to the tier-1 monopolist if and only if F ≤ FNT where
FNT = W1(ρ) −W2(ρ).
If (6) is violated, so that we are in case (i) or (iii) of Figure 1, then in equilibrium
the sellers Pareto coordinate on the safe strategy for all FNT ≥ 0 and the tier-1
certfier has no market share. Thus, under non-transparency, the outcome is the
same as with a competitive tier-1 industry, except for the monopolist lump-sum
payment FNT in case (ii) of Figure 1.
Suppose that instead the monopolist opts for transparency (T). For any fixed
fee F charged by the monopolist tier-1 certifier, we can apply the analysis leading
to Proposition 1: we only need to replace the function W1(ρ^) by the function
W1(0)−F. WhenW1 (0)−W2 (ρ) > 0–a condition stronger than (6)–then in an
equilibrium that is Pareto-undominated for the sellers, sellers opt for an ambitious
strategy and apply first to the tier-1 monopolist if and only if F ≤ FT where
FT = W1(0) −W2(ρ) < FNT .
If W1 (0)−W2 (ρ) ≤ 0, then the monopolist faces no demand at any non-negative
fee F ≥ 0.
To sum up, a profit maximizing tier-1 certifier strictly prefers non-transparency
when (6) is satisfied (case (ii) in Figure 1), and has no market share and is therefore
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indifferent between transparency or non-transparency when (6) is violated (cases
(i) and (iii) in Figure 1).
Proposition 3 Suppose that tier-2 certification is competitive. A monopoly tier-
1 certifier has positive market share if and only if condition (6) is satisfied; the
monopolist opts for non-transparency so as to maximize the sellers’ incentive to
apply for tier-1 certification. Up to a lump-sum transfer, the outcome is exactly
the same as for a competitive tier-1 industry.
Thus, unlike in Lizzeri’s (1999) work, disclosure does not hinge on market struc-
ture. Note also that this result would hold as well if certifiers did not charge fees
and cared only about market share: Regardless of the number of tier-1 certifiers,
transparency is a dominated strategy.
Market power in tier-2 certification.
Consider now the opposite case, where the market for tier-1 certification is
perfectly competitive, while the market for tier-2 certification is monopolized. Note
that in our setup, transparency is a non-issue for a tier-2 certifier. This case is
slightly more complicated to analyze, so we simplify the analysis by assuming that
SH (ρ^) = SL (ρ^) ≥ 0 for all ρ^ and that d = 0. Let F be the fixed fee charged by the
monopoly tier-2 certifier. We still denote byW1 (ρ^) andW2 (ρ^) the expected gross
payoffs when applying to a tier-1 or tier-2 certifier, when certification by a tier-2
certifier delivers reputation ρ. The only difference is that we are now allowing
sellers to refrain from applying to a tier-2 certifier if the price F is so high that
their expected surplus is negative. Simmplifying notation, these payoffs can be
written as
W1(ρ) ≡ ρS(1) + (1− ρ)δmax {S(ρ) − F, 0}
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and
W2(ρ) ≡ max {S(ρ) − F, 0} .
From Proposition 1, the sellers’ Pareto-dominant equilibrium involves an am-
bitious strategy of applying first to a tier-1 certifier if and only if
W1 (ρ) > W2 (ρ) .
Then the profit of the tier-2 certifier is (1− ρ) F per seller as long as F ≤ S (0)
(in this case, a seller rejected by a tier-1 certifier applies to the tier-2 certifier)
and 0 otherwise (in this case, a seller rejected by a tier-1 certifier gives up on
certification). On the other hand if
W1 (ρ) ≤W2 (ρ) ,
which implies F ≤ S (ρ), then the Pareto-dominant equilibrium involves direct
tier-2 applications, and the tier-2 certifier makes a profit of F per seller.
Let F˜ be the fee such that W1 (ρ) = W2 (ρ):




Hence we have W1 (ρ) ≤W2 (ρ) if and only if F ≤ F˜.
We assume that the tier-2 certifier does not discount the future and maxim-
izes per-seller profit. There are two cases to consider depending on whether F˜ or
(1− ρ)S (0) is greater.
The tier-2 certifier sets F = S (0) if (1− ρ)S (0) > F˜ and F = F˜ otherwise.
In the first case, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium involves an ambitious strategy,
and in the second case, a safe strategy. Turning to the competitive case (which
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is equivalent to F = 0), we see that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium involves an
ambitious strategy if F˜ < 0 and a safe strategy otherwise. Hence a monopolized
tier-2 certification market leads to an ambitious strategy equilibrium for a larger
set of parameter values compared to the perfectly competitive case. This result is
to be contrasted with Proposition 1. In essence, tier-2 market power makes tier-2
certification less attractive and favors ambitious strategies.
Proposition 4 Suppose that tier-1 certification is competitive, that SH (·) = SL (·)
and that d = 0. With a monopoly tier-2 certifier, the outcome is an ambitious
strategy equilibrium for a larger set of parameter values than with competitive tier-
2 certifiers.
The key feature leading to lack of transparency under perfect competition in
the certification industry is that the sellers choose their certifiers, not that they
pay them.
4.2 Seller heterogeneity
Next we allow for seller heterogeneity when tier-1 certification is competitive or
monopolized. Seller heterogeneity raises the possibility of sorting through con-
tracts that are differentiated in the payment terms and in the ensuing reputation
pattern. We assume that ρ lies in the continuum [0, 1] and that only the seller
knows ρ. In equilibrium, sellers with ρ > ρ∗, for some cutoff ρ∗, go for tier-1
certification and sellers with ρ < ρ∗ for the safe strategy. As we will see, non-
transparency is optimal for tier-1 certifiers for three reasons. The first two reasons
are the same as in the case of seller homogeneity: transparency reduces the in-
dividual seller’s utility as well as the stigma from tier-2 certification. The third
reason, specific to heterogeneity, also argues against transparency: among types
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selecting tier-1 certification, transparency hurts high types less than low types and
so is a bad screening device to extract the high types’ rent.
For notational simplicity, we assume that d = 0.
Competitive certification industry. In equilibrium, types ρ > ρ∗ go to a tier-1
certifier while types ρ < ρ∗ do not, where the cutoff ρ∗ as well as the probability
ρ of a high type given tier-2 certification are given by:
ρ∗SH(1) + δ(1− ρ











These two equations yield two monotonically increasing mappings between ρ∗ and
ρ, confirming the existence of strategic complementarities. There can be multiple
equilibria: equilibria with high values of ρ^ and ρ∗ and equilibria with low values
of ρ^ and ρ∗. The former correspond to the safe strategy equilibria, and the latter
to the ambitious strategy equilibria of the homogenous seller case of Section 3.
As in Section 3, the analysis of equilibria is not affected by entry of transparent
tier-1 certifiers. These certifiers do not attract any sellers in equilibrium.
Monopoly tier-1 certifier. Amonopoly tier-1 certifier builds an incentive-compatible
mechanism {F(ρ), ρ(ρ)}, where F(ρ) is the fee demanded from type ρ and ρ(ρ) is the
ex-post reputation in case of rejection: ρ(ρ) = 0 in case of disclosure/transparency
and ρ(ρ) = ρ (the general reputation in the absence of disclosure) otherwise.
Type ρ’s utility is
W(ρ) = ρSH(1) + δ(1− ρ)SL(ρ(ρ)) − F(ρ)
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and so incentive compatibility can be written as
dW(ρ)
dρ
= SH(1) − δSL(ρ(ρ)) > 0.
There is a cutoff ρ∗ such that sellers apply to the tier-1 certifier if and only if








(1− ρ)g(ρ)1{ρ^(ρ) = ρ^}dρ
. (7)
where 1{ρ^(ρ) = ρ^} is the indicator function taking the value 1 if ρ^ (ρ) = ρ^ and 0
otherwise.
Given ρ∗, we integrate the incentive compatibility constraint to find for ρ > ρ∗
W(ρ) = ρ∗SH(ρ) + (1− ρ∗)SL (ρ^) +
ρ
ρ∗
[SH(1) − δSL(ρ(ρ˜))]dρ˜. (8)
We can then write down the certifier’s profit as follows
 1
ρ∗
[ρSH(1) + δ(1− ρ)SL(ρ(ρ)) −W(ρ)]g(ρ)dρ,











The certifier’s problem is then to maximize (9) over ρ∗ and {ρ^ (ρ)}ρ≥ρ∗, subject
to (7). A simple inspection of this maximization shows that it is optimal to set
ρ(ρ) = ρ (no transparency) for all ρ ≥ ρ∗. The fee F (ρ) = ρSH(1)+δ(1−ρ)SL(ρ)−
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W (ρ) is independent of ρ (non-responsiveness).
Proposition 5 Non-transparency obtains under heterogeneous sellers whether tier-
1 certification is competitive or monopolized. Furthermore, with heterogeneous
sellers, a monopoly tier-1 certifier charges a type-independent fee.
It is optimal for a tier-1 monopolist to adopt non-transparency for three reasons.
First, this policy maximizes the stigma associated with tier-2 certification; second,
among tier-1 customers, transparency does not help screen high types since it hurts
them less than lower types; finally, transparency directly reduces the utility of tier-1
customers by lowering their utility in case of rejection to SL(0).
4.3 Multi-tier certification
Assume now that certifiers can, at cost c ≥ 0, provide a fine grade if they choose so
(which, for a competitive certification industry, is equivalent to the sellers wanting
a fine grade). We maintain the assumption that d = 0 for expositional simplicity.
In the same way they do not want to disclose unsuccessful applications, tier-1
certifiers do not gain by transforming themselves into multi-tier certifiers. The
question is then whether tier-2 certifiers are displaced by multi-tier certifiers and
how this affects the sellers’ incentive to apply to tier-1 certifiers.
The broad intuition, which we develop in more detail below, goes as follows:
Sellers who would otherwise have applied directly to a tier-2 certifier can avoid the
adverse-selection stigma by turning to a multi-tier certifier. This stigma avoidance
involves cost c and comes at a further cost if sellers are information averse. If
sellers are information loving or neutral, and the cost of fine grading is small,
multi-tier certification drives out tier-2 certifiers; it also drives out tier-1 certifiers
as resubmission after a rejection by a tier-1 certifier involves a delay and cannot
29
prevent the buyers from knowing that quality is not high. Thus, if fine grading is
costless, minimum-standard certification can survive only if sellers are information
averse.
Consider first an ambitious-submission equilibrium (x = 1) under minimum-
standard certification (Section 3). Sellers obtain ρSH(1) + δ(1 − ρ)SL(0). But
they can avoid discounting and obtain ρSH(1) + (1− ρ)SL(0) − c by turning to a
multi-tier certifier directly. The tiered-certification equilibrium therefore requires,
besides condition (6), that
ρSH(1) + δ(1− ρ)SL(0) ≥ ρSH(1) + (1− ρ)SL(0) − c
⇐⇒ c ≥ c ≡ (1− δ)(1− ρ)SL(0).
If c < c, tier-2 certifiers overcome the stigma they face in an ambitious-strategy
equilibrium by converting to multi-tier certification.
Second, consider a safe-strategy equilibrium (x = 0), and so condition (1)
obtains. This equilibrium is robust to the introduction of full-grading if and only
if furthermore
ρSH(ρ) + (1− ρ)SL(ρ) ≥ ρSH(1) + (1− ρ)SL(0) − c
⇐⇒ c ≥ c ≡ c ≡ ρ[SH(1) − SH(ρ)] − (1− ρ)[SL(ρ) − SL(0)].
Note that when c = 0, this condition holds if and only if the sellers are information
averse.22
22For the sake of completeness, we can consider a mixed equilibrium (0 < x < 1). A necessary
and sufficient condition for this equilibrium to be robust to the introduction of fine grading is
that the sellers who apply directly to a tier-2 certifier do not find it advantageous to go for a full
grade:
ρSH(ρ(x)) + (1− ρ)SL(ρ(x)) ≥ ρSH (1) + (1− ρ)SL(0) − c.
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To sum up, sellers resort to multi-tier grading when its cost c is low, when
sellers are impatient (δ is low), and when sellers are information neutral or loving.
Proposition 6 Multi-tier grading occurs for a larger set of parameters, the lower
its cost c, the more impatient the sellers (the lower δ), and the less information-
averse the sellers are (the higher ρ[SH(1) − SH(ρ)] − (1− ρ)[SL(ρ) − SL(0)]).
Entry attempts into multi-tier grading seem to resonate with academic exper-
ience. Illustrations include fine grading by bepress and the proliferation of prizes
offered by tier-2 journals (and not by tier-1 journals). Alternatively, multi-tier
grading can piggyback on an existing tier-1 certifier. For example, the American
Economic Association launched the American Economic Journals; to be certain,
the AEA is careful about not describing the AEJs as lower tier relative to the
American Economic Review, and the process is a bit different from a multi-tier
process, but the fundamentals driving the introduction of the AEJs are the same
as those developed in this section. Nature operates a very similar system via its
set of “Nature Research Journals,” of which Nature Biotechnology is probably one
of the best known.23
Proposition 6 may also shed some light on rating agencies’ practice of fine
grading. As we observed in Example 3 (Section 2), bond ratings not only certify
the quality of an issue but also allow matching between securities and buyers.
23Both for the American Economic Review and for Nature, the process is similar. For example,
If a paper submitted to Nature is close to being publishable (but not quite so), and a good fit
with a Nature research journal, then the Nature editors add a paragraph in their decision letter
encouraging the author to send it to the appropriate Nature research journal. If the author does
choose to submit to a research journal after such a referral (the research journal editors are cc’ed
on letters containing referrals), the Nature editor will be notified, and will send the editor of
the research journal the Nature referee reports. The Nature editor will also sometimes talk to
the editor of the research journal. The research journal editor (a) may accept the paper without
further review, (b) may ask for changes, followed by either an acceptance or re-refereeing, or (c)
may just reject the paper.
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This matching dimension became more important in the mid 1970s, when broker-
dealers’ regulatory assessment of solvency (and then insurers’, pension funds’, and,
with Basel II, banks’) started to make use of ratings, creating a strong demand
for high-quality liquid claims. The matching dimension is captured here by sellers
becoming more information loving. The mid-1970s coincidentally were a turning
point in the business model of rating agencies, which switched to the issuer-pays
mode.
Remarks: Our assumption that certifiers can commit to a given disclosure policy
may be a bit stretched in the case of multi-tier grading. Suppose that such a
commitment is enforced by reputational concerns, and consider a tier-2 certifier
trying to break a tiered-certification equilibrium by converting into a multi-tier
grade certifier. If sellers do not believe in this strategy, the certifier is deprived of
high types and cannot (and has no incentive to) develop a reputation for accurate,
fine grading. As we earlier indicated, we leave foundations of commitment for future
research, but we note that our commitment assumption may be more problematic
for some forms of certification than for others.24
Proposition 6 focuses on a competitive certifying industry. In an online ap-
pendix, we consider a monopoly certifier who can costlessly engage in fine grading;
we perform a mechanism design exercise and shows how efficient disclosure relates
to the sellers’ information aversion.
24We can, however, capture this idea through the following reduced form: Suppose that each
certifier secretly chooses between spending 0 and spending c per review (say, by recruiting talen-
ted employees), and announces publicly its certification strategy (tier-1, tier-2, multi-tier); and
that it incurs a finite penalty for incorrect rankings. No certifier has an incentive to invest in the
cost c per review if sellers choose an ambitious strategy and believe that certifiers do not invest
in the extra cost.
32
4.4 Further extensions
The appendix analyzes three other extensions. Appendix 1 endogenizes the quality
of the seller’s product. Quality depends on the seller’s costly effort e. Higher effort
increases the probability that the quality is high, but does not change the probab-
ility that the quality is abysmal. We completely characterize the equilibrium. We
show that quality is always higher in an ambitious-strategy equilibrium than in a
safe strategy equilibrium. Moreover, we show that transparency weakly improves
sellers’ welfare, and weakly reduces quality. When it does so strictly, a safe-
strategy equilibrium with low quality investment replaces an ambitious-strategy
equilibrium with high quality investment.
Appendix 2 maintains the assumption that sellers select certifiers, but intro-
duces the possibility that certifiers charge buyers (this requires that the certifier
be able to prevent buyers from reselling the information to each other). It shows
that the analysis of this paper is robust to charges levied by certifiers on buyers.
Appendix 3 allows for a class of quick turn-around tier-1 certifiers. Shorter cer-
tification lags result in reduced accuracy in the form of type-I and type-II errors.25
We completely characterize the equilibrium. We derive explicit conditions under
which the equilibrium features sellers first applying to a quick turn-around tier-1
certifier and then to a tier-2 certifier in case of rejection. Interestingly, the struc-
ture of equilibria depends on whether the decisions to apply to a quick turn-around
tier-1 certifier instead of a tier-1 certifier are strategic complements or substitutes.
We show that they are strategic complements when the probability of a type-1 error
is high, the probability of a type-2 error is small, and the turn-around advantage
of the quick turn-around certifier is high. In an online appendix, we further show
25Of course quick turn-around need not be associated with lower quality and may just result
from superior effort or norms. But choices become meaningful when within a given category of
certifiers, turn-around-time and accuracy covary negatively.
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that the more competitive the industry, the more likely it is that certifiers offer a
quick (slower) turn-around time if certifiers maximize market share (profit).
5 Summary and conclusion
Certifiers such as journals, rating agencies, standard setting bodies and providers
of standardized tests play an increasingly important role in our market economies.
This paper makes an initial attempt at understanding how the certification in-
dustry caters to the sellers’ demand through strategies such as the non-disclosure
of rejections, and analyzes the welfare implications of such policies.
In the absence of regulation, certifiers do not publicize rejected applications.
First, such disclosure reduces the individual seller’s (the certifier’s clients) utility.
Second, when there is market power in tier-1 certification, the certifier is eager to
increase the stigma from tier-2 certification, and thereby soften competition, by
not disclosing rejections. Third, and again under tier-1 market power, but when
sellers are heterogeneous, disclosure does not help capture the rent of the most
confident sellers, as the latter are less affected by disclosure than less-confident
ones.
On the positive side, we also examined when sellers are willing to take the risk
of applying to a tier-1 certifier. This willingness hinges on the behavior of other
sellers (which affects the stigma associated with a tier-2 acceptance, leading to
strategic complementarities), the discount factor (which impacts the cost of an
ambitious submission strategy), and sellers’ information aversion (which determ-
ines the reputation-risk tolerance).
On the normative side, sellers’ gaming of the certification process involves costs:
delay (or, in a variant of our model, duplication of certification costs) and possibly
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excessive information exposure; as self-regulation does not promote transparency,
these costs were shown to provide a role for public regulation. We showed that
transparency regulation always benefits sellers, but need not benefit buyers.
Finally, we investigated a number of extensions/robustness checks by allowing
multi-tier certification, fees charged to buyers, endogenous choice of quality by
sellers, and endogenous choice of turn around by certifiers.
Turning back to Table 1, it is not surprising in light of our theoretical predic-
tions that the bulk of the entries are under the opaque heading. State licensing
examinations may be fundamentally different due to the presence of regulatory
dicta; accordingly, “sellers” cannot choose their certifier. Entry-level examinations
exhibit transparency, but may or may not exhibit fine grading. These features may
reflect the power imbalance between the buyers (say, colleges) and sellers (would-
be students). In this instance, it is the buyers rather than the sellers who choose
certifiers, which probably explains the unusual entry in Table 1.26 Finally, and also
consistent with our theory, it is not surprising that in situations where we would
anticipate that information aversion would be greatest (e.g., an undergraduate or
MBA student going on the job market, an entrepreneurial firm going public), we
see minimum standard certification rather than a fine-grained scheme.
26Top schools want to be matched with top students. They therefore have an incentive to
demand transparency as well as tier-1 certification or a fine grading.
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Appendix 1 (endogenous quality)
This Appendix shows that our analysis is unchanged when the choice of quality
depends on the equilibrium of the certification process. Suppose that quality
depends on the seller’s investment effort e ∈ [e, e]. We are interested in modeling
a dimension of effort that affects the likelihood of a high quality outcome but does
not change the probability of an abysmal outcome. It is reasonable to think that
those margins respond to different forms of investment, and that for some of the
examples that we have in mind, the latter margin would be quite inelastic.27 Hence
our focus on the former.
Let q be the probability that a product is not abysmal. A higher effort increases
the probability of the high quality ρ (e) outcome conditional on a non-abysmal out-
come. Let ψ (e) denote the disutility of effort. We assume that ρ (e) is increasing
and concave in e and that ψ (e) is increasing and convex in e with ρ′ (e) = +∞
and ψ′ (e) = 0. To simplify the analysis, we also assume that SL () = SH () (as
in Examples 1 through 3), and that d = 0.
We define two ex-ante payoff functions W1 and W2 as follows:
W1 (ρ^) ≡ max
e
{q [ρ (e)S (1) + δ (1− ρ (e)) S (ρ^)] −ψ (e)}
and
W2 (ρ^) ≡ max
e
{qS (ρ^) −ψ (e)} .
Let e1 (ρ^) and e2 (ρ^) be the solutions of the maximization problems underlying
W1 and W2. Clearly, e2 (ρ^) = e.







27More generally, the analysis extends straightforwardly to a small elasticity of abysmal quality
to effort.
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The result follows immediately.
There are two potential equilibria. The ambitious strategy equilibrium effort
level e1∗ and the safe-strategy equilibrium effort level e2∗ are determined by the
following equations:
e1∗ = e1(0) > e = e2∗.
The safe strategy is an equilibrium if and only if
W2 (ρ (e)) ≥ W1 (ρ (e))
while the ambitious strategy equilibrium is an equilibrium if and only if
W1 (0) ≥ W2 (0) .
From Lemma 1, an equilibrium always exists. The safe and risky strategy
equilibria coexist over a range of parameters. When there are multiple equilibria,
we select the ex-ante Pareto dominant equilibrium. Let W1T ≡ W1 (0) denote the
sellers’ welfare under mandated transparency. The analysis is then identical to
the case where effort is exogenous, with ρ replaced by ρ (e) and W1, W1T , and
W2 replaced by W1, W1T , and W2. In particular, transparency weakly improves
sellers’ welfare. When it does so strictly, a safe-strategy equilibrium with low-
quality investment replaces an ambitious-strategy equilibrium with high-quality
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investment.
Proposition 8 When quality is endogenous,
(i) quality is always higher in an ambitious-strategy equilibrium than in a safe-
strategy one;
(ii) transparency weakly improves sellers’ welfare and weakly reduces quality.
Appendix 2 (buyer-pay paradigm)
We could alternatively assume that certifiers can monitor that buyers do not com-
municate the ratings among each other, and so that they can charge buyers rather
than sellers (how much they can charge depends on the context, as the buyers’
willingness to pay depends on the anticipated pricing strategy of the sellers). Ima-
gine now that certifiers are perfectly competitive profit maximizers and can charge
buyers but not sellers. Suppose for simplicity that when deciding whether to buy
the rating, buyers do not yet know their type. Then the payment to the certifier
is a lump-sum payment, equal to the buyers’ expected net surplus, and has no
influence on seller payoffs Si (ρ). Consider, for example, Example 2 of Section 2.2
(the logic extends more generally). When condition (6) is satisfied, and letting as
earlier B(ρ) denote buyer surplus, B(ρ) = µ(aH−aL) if ρ ≥ ρ0, B(ρ) = 0 if ρ < ρ0.
Tier-1 certifiers can charge fee FB = B (1) for the disclosure of a successful tier-1
application. Tier-2 certifiers can charge a fee FB = B (0) = 0 for the disclosure of a
successful tier-2 application. In this ambitious-strategy equilibrium, buyers know
that a tier-2 certification means that the seller was previously rejected by a tier-1
certifier, and thus neither tier-1 nor tier-2 certifiers are able to charge anything for
the disclosure of a failed tier-1 application. In this case, disclosing this information
for free to buyers is indifferent to sellers. Suppose instead that condition (6) is viol-
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ated. Then tier-2 certifiers can charge FB = B (ρ) for the disclosure of a successful
tier-2 application. There is then no way for a tier-1 certifier to make a profit and
attract sellers, whether or not they disclose failed applications and charge for it or
not. The analysis of the equilibrium is therefore completely identical to the case
where certifiers charge sellers and not buyers. The only difference is that certifiers
appropriate the buyer’s surplus that is not appropriated by sellers.
For example, academic journals have traditionally charged the buying side.
They bundled, however, the certification and distribution function. The distribu-
tion function nowadays can be performed through web sites and web repositories
(although journals try to keep the two activities bundled through requirements not
to keep papers posted once they are accepted). The recent advocacy in favor of
open access publishing (charging authors through submission and/or publication
fees, rather than readers) may accelerate this unbundling. An interesting literature
(e.g., McCabe-Snyder 2005, 2007,2010 and Jeon-Rochet 2010) analyzes certifica-
tion from the point of view of two-sided markets theory. In particular, it looks at
when academic journals should charge readers or authors, and how the quality of
certification is affected by this choice. By way of contrast, the issues of transpar-
ency and sequential certification remain to be investigated in full generality in this
context.
To sum up, because the analysis rests entirely on the seller’s surplus Si(ρ),
nothing is altered by introducing a buyer fee,28 in the same way the analysis was
shown to carry over to the case of a monopolistic certifier charging a seller fee.
The non-transparency result is thus very robust.
28The certifier then obtains a rent. This rent can be dissipated either through free entry when
there is a fixed entry cost into the certification industry (monopolistic competition) or through
a subsidy to sellers for an exclusive certification (as emphasized by two-sided markets theory).
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Appendix 3 (quick turn-around)
We now assume that tier-1 certifiers choose their certification delays so as to attract
sellers. Shorter lags may increase the certification cost (here normalized at 0)
or (as modeled here) result in reduced accuracy. We assume that quick turn-
around certifiers make type-I and type-II errors. They receive a high signal H
with probability 1 − zH if the actual quality is high, and zL if it is low, where
1 − zH > zL. Thus, they act as tier-1 certifiers with noisy signals. To capture
the idea that short turn-around times benefit the sellers, we assume that a quick
turn-around certification takes less time (and therefore is subject to discount factor
δ^ > δ), while both tier-1 and tier-2 certification take a full period.29 To ensure that
these quick turn-around certifiers are not able to supersede the tier-2 certifiers in
ensuring that quality is not abysmal, we assume that they look for an H type (only
H and L types can get the H signal) but in the absence of an H signal, cannot rule
out the abysmal quality.
A seller who is rejected by a quick turn-around certifier can apply to a tier-2
certifier without losing as much time as if he had been rejected by a tier-1 certifier.
We will make assumptions so that it is never optimal to turn directly to a tier-2
certifier, and that it is never optimal to turn to a quick turn-around certifier after a
rejection either by a tier-1 certifier or by a quick turn-around certifier. We further
assume that d = 0, and that SH(ρ) = SL(ρ) ≡ S(ρ) for all ρ, so as to simplify the
analysis.
29In order to avoid integer problems (and the concomitant possibility that the date of product
introduction reveal the strategy), one must assume in this section that sellers arrive in continuous
time (but the certification length is still discrete).
Alternatively, we could assume that quick turn-around results in a random certification length





ρ(1− zH) + (1− ρ)zL
denote the posterior belief following an H signal by a quick turn-around certifier.
Such a signal is good news for the quality of the product, i.e. ρ+ > ρ, since
1 > zH + zL.
Our first assumption adapts condition (6) to the setup of this section. It ensures
that no safe-strategy equilibrium exists, as sellers would then rather choose to try
a tier-1 certifier first:
ρS (1) + (1− ρ) δS (ρ) > S (ρ) . (10)
Our second assumption is sufficient to ensure that after a rejection by a tier-1
certifier, a seller prefers to apply to a tier-2 certifier than to try a quick turn-around
certifier (and then a tier-2 certifier in case of rejection by the quick turn-around
certifier):
δS (0) ≥ δ^ (zLS (1) + (1− zL) δS (0)) . (11)
Our third assumption is sufficient to ensure that after a rejection by a quick
turn-around certifier, a seller prefers to apply to a tier-2 certifier than to a tier-1
certifier (and then a tier-2 certifier in case of rejection by the tier-1 certifier):
δS(0) ≥ δ[ρ2(1)S(1) + δ[1− ρ2(1)]S(0)], (12)
where ρ2 (1), the posterior beliefs following a rejection by a quick-turn-around
certifier, is defined below. Note that the left-hand-side of this equation corresponds
to the most pessimistic beliefs possible–this is why is condition is sufficient but
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not necessary.
Last, we ensure that a seller does not want to turn to another quick turn-around
certifier after being rejected by one. A sufficient condition for the absence of such
repeated attempts is that false positives be perfectly correlated among quick turn-
around certifiers, and so a failed attempt to be certified by such a certifier does
not lead to other attempts.
Given these assumptions, the only relevant strategic consideration is whether
to apply to a quick turn-around certifier or to a tier-1 certifier. Denote by y the
fraction of applicants who opt for a quick turn-around certification rather than
tier-1 certifiers.
Let ρ2 = ρ2(y) denote the posterior beliefs following tier-2 certification:
ρ2 (y) = yρzHyρzH + y(1− ρ)(1− zL) + (1− y)(1− ρ) .
We necessarily have ρ+ > ρ > ρ2 (y). Both false positives and false negatives
improve the pool of applications to tier-2 certifiers and decrease the stigma asso-
ciated with tier-2 certification. As long as zH > 0, ρ2 (y) increases with y as the
stigma associated with tier 2 certification decreases.
For a given probability y, sellers turn to a certifier with low turn-around time
rather than to a tier-1 certifier if and only if Ψ(y) ≥ 0 where:
Ψ(y) = δ^[ρ(1− zH) + (1− ρ)zL]S(ρ
+) + [ρzH + (1− ρ)(1− zL)]δ^δS(ρ2(y))
−δ[ρS(1) + δ(1− ρ)S(ρ2(y))].
The sign of Ψ′(y) determines whether the choices between tier-1 certification and
quick turn-around certification are strategic complements (positive sign) or sub-
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stitutes (negative sign). Decisions are strategic complements if and only if




The left-hand side of (13) is the probability of being rejected when applying to a
quick turn-around certifier. The right-hand side of (13) is the discounted prob-
ability of being rejected by a tier-1 certifier. Increasing y reduces the stigma of
applying to a tier-2 certifier, which impacts the payoff of both the tier-1 certi-
fication strategy and the quick turn-around application strategy in proportion to
these probabilities. The higher zH , the lower zL and the lower δ, the more likely
is (13) to be verified.
When (13) holds, then there can be multiple equilibria. This occurs when the
following additional conditions hold:
Ψ(0) < 0 < Ψ(1). (14)
If there are multiple equilibria, the equilibrium where all sellers first turn to quick
turn-around certifiers has higher seller welfare. Indeed, combining a revealed
preference argument (Ψ(1) > 0) and the fact that ρS(1) + δ(1 − ρ)S(ρ2(1)) >
ρS(1) + δ(1 − ρ)S(0) yields the result. We maintain the maximization of seller
welfare as our selection criterion, and so the economy will find itself in the quick
turn-around equilibrium as long as Ψ(1) > 0. Again, if multiple equilibria coexist,
sellers are better off in the one with the least stigma attached to tier-2 certification.
When (13) is violated, the equilibrium is unique, and may entail mixed strategies.
If Ψ(1) ≥ 0 (and hence Ψ(0) > 0), then the equilibrium involves quick turn-around
certification. When Ψ(0) ≤ 0 (and hence Ψ(1) < 0), then the equilibrium involves
tier-1 certification. When Ψ(1) < 0 < Ψ(0), then the equilibrium involves mixed
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strategies.
Proposition 9 Suppose that 0 < zH < 1− zL and that (10) through (12) hold. If
(13) holds, then the equilibrium involves quick turn-around certification if Ψ(1) ≥ 0
and tier-1 certification otherwise. If (13) is violated, then the equilibrium involves
quick turn-around certification when Ψ(1) ≥ 0, tier-1 certification when Ψ(0) ≤ 0,
and mixed strategies otherwise.
Market structure and quick turn-around
The online appendix analyzes how market structure affects the emergence of
quick turn-around certification versus tiered certification. More specifically, it
maintains the assumption that the market for tier-2 certifiers is perfectly compet-
itive, and analyzes the impact of the degree of competition among tier-1 certifiers.
We show that the effect of competition depends on its nature, namely whether
certifiers choose prices to maximize profit or else do not set prices and maximize
market shares. We find conditions under which competition enhances quick turn-
around certification when certifiers compete in market shares and not in prices.
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